

Company I, and a private. A prisoner who was brought in, in the course of the battle, declared that Gen. Johnston was shot, and fell from his horse at his feet. When Col. Burnside fell from his horse he uttered a moment with a Rebel officer, who told him whether he was wounded, when he replied, "Only slightly." "I am mortally wounded," said the Rebel, "and I can have no object in deceiving you. I assure you that we have 80,000 men in and within forty minutes of Manassas Junction."

COL. MONTGOMERY OF NEW-JERSEY.
Several Senators who were near the field of battle relate one occurrence which reflects great credit upon Col. Montgomery, of the New-Jersey First Volunteers. His regiment was coming up as a reinforcement, and was a short distance east of Centerville when our retreating soldiers attempted to pass him. He halted, checked as many as possible, encouraged them to turn back, by saying that he and his Jerseymen were going to fight the Rebels and wanted their help.

GEN. MCLELLAN.
Gen. McClellan immediately takes command on the other side of the Potomac. Gen. Rosecrantz takes his command.

MORE TROOPS CALLED FOR.
Government has telegraphed to Massachusetts five thousand men, and to New-York for five thousand more.

SOONER REPORTS FROM THE FIELD OF BATTLE.
W. A. Croft has just returned from the battle-field, and reports that the Ellsworth Zouaves, 6th New-York, Rhode Island 1st and 2d, Minnesota 1st, and parts of the Delaware, Vermont, and Connecticut troops were among those most badly slaughtered. All our troops, except one Pennsylvania regiment, whose time had expired, and who refused to make a charge, fought most bravely, and drove back the Rebel cavalry and infantry, time after time, but were finally routed by the terrific fire of small shot from the batteries, and fell back to Centerville, and part of them to the fortifications opposite this city. The other two divisions have commenced to march themselves at Centerville.

THE AGGRESSIVE MOVEMENT.
There is no prospect of an immediate aggressive movement by the Rebels. They might have cut off easily by going three miles.

NUMBER KILLED.
Probably not more than 1,000 Federal troops are killed. The enemy was very badly damaged. Many of our wounded, and the Rhode Island and three guns of Sherman's Battery, fell into the hands of the Rebels. Capt. Tower of the Rhode Island 1st was the first officer killed. Gov. Sprague and Col. Gorman are among the heroes of the day.

TO THE ASSOCIATED PRESS.
WASHINGTON, Monday, July 22, 1861.
After the latest information was received from Centerville at 7 o'clock last night, a series of events took place in the interest degree disastrous. Many confused statements are prevalent, but enough is known to warrant the statement that we have suffered in a degree which has not been known since the battle of Bull Run, and excited the deepest melancholy throughout Washington.

The carriage is tremendously heavy on both sides, and on ours it is represented as frightful. We were advancing and taking their marked batteries gradually, but suddenly, and driving the enemy toward Manassas Junction, when the enemy seemed to have been reinforced by Gen. Johnston, who, it is understood, took command and immediately commenced driving us back, when a panic among our troops suddenly occurred and a regular stampede took place.

It is thought that Gen. McDowell undertook to make a stand at or about Centerville, but the panic was so fearful that the whole army became demoralized, and it was impossible to check them, either at Centerville or at Fairfax Court-House.

Gen. McDowell intended to make another stand at Fairfax Court-House, but our forces being in full retreat, he could not accomplish the object.

Beyond Fairfax Court-House the retreat was kept up until the men reached their regular encampment, a portion of whom returned to them, but a still larger portion coming inside the intrenchments.

A large number of the troops in their retreat fell on the way side from exhaustion, and scattered along the route all the way from Fairfax Court-House.

The road from Bull Run was strewn with knapsacks, arms, &c. Some of our troops desecratedly threw away their guns and equipments, the better to facilitate their travel.

Gen. McDowell was in the rear of the retreat, exerting himself to rally his men, but only with partial effect.

The latter part of the army, it is said, made their retreat in order.

He was completely exhausted, having slept but little for three nights. His orders on the field did not at all times reach those for whom they were intended.

It is supposed that the force sent out against our troops, consisted, according to a prisoner's statement, of about 30,000 men, including a large number of cavalry. He further says that owing to reinforcements from Richmond, Strasburg and other points, the enemy's effective force was 50,000 men.

The panic was so great that the attempt to rally them to a stand at Centerville was entirely vain. If a firm stand had been made there, our troops could have been reinforced and much disaster prevented. Gen. McDowell was thus aided in his well arranged plans.

It is supposed all the provision trains belonging to the United States Government were saved. Some regimental wagons were overturned by accident or the wheels came off, and had therefore to be abandoned. Large droves of cattle were saved by being driven back in the advance of the retreat.

[An officer just from Virginia (10:30) reports that the road from Centerville to the Potomac is strewn with stragglers. The troops are resuming the occupation of the fortifications and intrenchments on the line of the Potomac.

who had incautiously advanced immediately after the body of the army, and lined the Warrenton road.

Their concentration was shamed by numerous civilians who were on the ground, and for a time it seemed as if our whole army was in retreat. Many baggage-wagons were emptied, and their horses galloped across the open fields, all the fences of which were torn down to allow them a more rapid retreat. For a time a perfect panic prevailed, which communicated itself to the vicinity of Centerville, and every available conveyance was seized upon by agitated civilians. Wounded soldiers cried on the roadside for assistance, but the alarm was so great that numbers were passed by.

Several similar alarms occurred on previous occasions, when a change of batteries rendered the retirement of the artillery on our part necessary, and it is most probable that the alarm was owing to the same fact.

The reserve force at Centerville was immediately brought up, and marched in double quick step in the following order:

Col. Einstein's 27th Pennsylvania Regiment, with two guns.

The Garibaldi Guards, and Colonel Blenker's 1st Rifle Regiment, with his batteries, followed at several miles distant by the De Kalb Regiment.

When our courier left at 4 o'clock, it was in the midst of this excitement. Two new marked batteries had been opened by the Rebels on the left flank, and that portion of the division had its lines broken and demanded immediate reinforcement. The right was in good order. The battery erected on the hill-side, directly opposite the main battery of the enemy, was doing good execution, and additional guns were being mounted. On his arrival at Fairfax Court-House, he was overtaken by a Government messenger, who reported that our army was in full retreat toward Centerville. They were followed by less agitated parties, who stated that the report of the retreat was owing to the fact that the alarm among the teamsters had communicated itself to the volunteers, and even to some instances to the regulars, and the lines were broken, and that a retirement of our forces across Bull's Run was rendered necessary.

The Rhode Island Battery was taken by the rebels at the bridge across Bull's Run, where their retreat was cut off. Their horses were all killed.

It is reported that the Black Horse Cavalry made an attack on the retreating army, when the latter turned and fired, killing all but six of the assaulting party.

The 71st New-York Regiment lost about half their men.

The following Regiments were engaged in the fight:

The 1st, 2d and 3d Connecticut Regiments.

The 1st Regiment of Regulars, composed of the 3d, 3d, and 8th Companies.

Two hundred and fifty Marines.

The 8th and 14th New-York Militia.

The 1st and 2d Rhode Island.

The 71st New-York.

The 2d New-Hampshire.

The 6th Massachusetts.

The 1st Minnesota.

The 1st Michigan, the 11th and 38th New-York, the 2d, 4th, and 5th Maine, and the 2d Vermont Regiments, beside the several batteries.

KILLED.

Gen. Patterson, of the 11th New-York.

Col. Sherman, of the 2d New-York.

Col. Johnson, of the 2d New-York.

Col. Wilson, of the 11th New-York.

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for the defensive, but for the renewal of offensive operations, are going on vigorously.

RETURN OF GEN. McDOWELL.

Gen. McDowell has returned to his headquarters at Arlington Heights. The regiments comprising his army will resume their positions. Most of them have already done so.

FEDERAL AND REBEL LOSSES AT BULL'S RUN.

WASHINGTON (via Baltimore), July 22, 1861.

I have spent eight hours in carefully questioning the returned soldiers in various parts of the city. Our losses are far less and severe than was at first reported by scared civilians and running soldiers. There are probably not 300 killed, and perhaps not 200; for example: The 2d Connecticut Regiment returned, which was reported in the morning as badly cut up, lost but a dozen.

The New-Haven Grays have all returned unharmed, yet this regiment was exposed to frequent volleys of cannon and musketry.

Again 200 of Ellsworth's Fire Zouaves were reported to have been surrounded in the road and annihilated by the Black Horse cavalry. On the contrary they cut down and destroyed the cavalry and suffered little loss themselves. In this encounter the New-York 71st, also reported as used up, suffered but little, and so of others. Few of the vast number of balls fired by the rebels took effect. On the contrary all the instances detailed by our men show that the enemy suffered severely.

Three New-York Fire Zouaves, who were scouting in the advance, hunted the rebels on the fly, like squirrels among the bushes, and chalked down 26 as positively killed by them.

The New-York 71st came upon a rifled gun. It lost 8 men, but in return killed the whole of the 18 rebels secured.

REBEL ACCOUNT OF BULL'S RUN FIGHT.

DISPERSION OF THE REBELS AT OREGON INLET.

LOUISVILLE, Monday, July 22, 1861.

A special dispatch to *The Nashville Union*, from Manassas, 18th, says, that at the fight at Bull's Run, Gen. Beauregard commanded in person. The enemy was repulsed three times in great confusion and loss.

The Washington Artillery, of New-Orleans, with 7 guns, engaged Sherman's 15th, and after making the latter change position fifteen times, silenced and forced them to retire. Large quantities of arms were taken. Our loss was trifling. Maj. Harrison and two privates were killed. Capt. Dulaney, Chismen, and three privates were wounded. A Federal officer of high rank was killed, and \$700 in gold taken from his body.

The reported attack upon the battery at Hatteras by the United States steamer *Wabash* is confirmed. It is also stated that an attack was made on Oregon Inlet, and the Rebels dispersed by shells.

Commodore Mervine transferred his pennant to the steamship *Colorado* on the 19th.

The Knoxville Whig withdraws the name of Gen. Twiggs and insists that of Polk for Governor of Tennessee.

SECESSION ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE.

RICHMOND, Va., July 21, 1861.

A fight commenced near Manassas at 5 o'clock this morning, and became general about 12. It continued till about 7, when the Federals retired, leaving us in possession of the field. Sherman's battery of light artillery was taken. It was a terrible battle, with great slaughter on both sides. It is impossible to give details to-night.

GEN. PATTERSON'S COLUMN STILL AT HARPER'S FERRY.

PHILADELPHIA, Monday, July 22, 1861.

Gen. Patterson's presence at Manassas Junction is a mistake. He was yesterday at Harper's Ferry, with a portion of his command, awaiting the arrival of Gen. Banks.

FROM MISSOURI.

ST. LOUIS, Monday, July 22, 1861.

Over two thousand dollars worth of medicines, belonging to Mr. Kelly of the firm of Gardner & Kelly of this city, designed for the South, were seized at Cape Girardeau, on the last trip of the steamer *Memphis*, by Col. March of the 29th Illinois Regiment, encamped at that point.

Ten wagons laden with 35 men, women, and children arrived last night from the Texas county, Missouri. These people were driven from their homes by the Secessionists.

Accounts from Calloway County represent the orderly and well-behaved manner of the Federal troops in that county as having an excellent effect upon the Secessionists.

JEFFERSON CITY, July 21, 1861.

Col. Mulligan's Chicago Brigade arrived here by special train at 8 o'clock this evening, and are now quartered at the depot.

From present indications it is probable that there will be a quarrel in the Convention. Members continue to quarrel daily.

THE MASSACHUSETTS TWELFTH.

BOSTON, Monday, July 22, 1861.

Orders have been received, hastening the departure of the 12th Regiment, Col. Webster, which will leave to-morrow night, via Fall River. The 13th Regiment Rifles, Col. Leonard, and Major Cobb's splendid battery of artillery will probably leave a week.

PRIZES AT BALTIMORE.

BALTIMORE, Monday, July 22, 1861.

The steam gunboat *Albatross* reports that the brig *Costa Rica*, from Philadelphia for Havana, was dismantled on the 11th, and would put back for Philadelphia. The *Albatross* had in charge two prizes, one from Galveston, and one from Charleston. (By telegraph to Ellwood Walter, Esq., Secretary Board of Underwriters.)

A CALL FROM COL. COCHRANE.

FIRST UNITED STATES CAVALRY.

HEAD QUARTERS, PALACE GARDEN, NEW-YORK, July 22, 1861.

Our army has suffered a reverse.

Our army has suffered a reverse. Troops are wanted to save the Government. Let the whole country assert itself, and hasten to the rescue.

My regiment needs a few hundred more recruits to enable it to take the field. Citizens, hasten to be enrolled in the cause of your country.

JOHN COCHRANE, Colonel.

TO THE TOP OF THEIR BENT.

To the Editor of *The N. Y. Tribune*.

Sir: Sitting to-day in the porch of a fine hotel here, I heard the original conversation between a Northern and a Southern which W. Shakespeare has treasured by preservation in the following conversation between Hamlet and Polonius:

Hamlet—Do you see yonder cloud that almost in the shape of a camel?

Polonius—By the mass, and like a camel, indeed.

Hamlet—Methinks it is a weasel.

Polonius—It is backed like a weasel.

Hamlet—Or is it a whale?

Polonius—Very like a whale.

If you want a man who will give all for truth and justice, go to Boston; if you want a man who will touch gloves with the assassin of his own Senator within two squares of the latter's private home, go to Boston. I do not mean to give you the conversation which I heard this morning; that, I assure you, is faithfully given in the extract from Hamlet above. The Bostonian stoned for saying that he favored the Union (kind soul) by allowing every noble name and idea of America, and especially of his own State, to be vilified in his presence.

—When is this contemptible and cowardly abatement to end? Has difference, then, actually become the chief Yankee characteristic whenever the Yankees get out of a workshop?

When I first set foot in New-England, fresh from the Slave States in which I was born and reared, I met at table in Boston the Hon. Mr. W. Hoar. Hearing that I was from the South, he instantly turned his attention to me and began a series of adulations of Southern people and Southern institutions; apologizing for his own region; sneering at the liberals of New-England as a very small band of crazy folk! I hope he will never know the chill that came upon me as he spoke. Through how many toils and struggles had I come to rest upon the freedom of New-England; through what weary paths came to regard the men he was sneering at as the heralds of a Nation's Promise Land! I turned and told him plainly and in a single sentence, that he had mistaken my opinions, which were not those common to the South; but I could not help thinking that if he and others had shown themselves braver and truer to their institutions, instead of apologists for Slavery, such opinions would have been much more common to the South.

I have in my mind a case of a very different kind. It was, I believe, about eight years ago, that I was consulted by a committee at New-Haven as to whether I knew any gentleman in the South who would be willing to deliver a lecture in New-Haven, in defense of the institution of Slavery. My mind fixed upon Geo. Fitzhugh, of King George County, Va., who had written works on the "Failure of Free Society," and "The Sociology of the South." Mr. Fitzhugh went to New-Haven, and gave, on the evening of his arrival, a lecture entitled, "Free Society a Failure." Wendell Phillips was present and heard the lecture, and Mr. F. evidently took pleasure in seeing him, by theories and speculations which had got into the crevices and under the ears of his brain, like the bats in the rickety old mansion, situated on the fringe of a once noble estate. This aspect of "the sacred soil" he had never left for a month, and of Free Society, of course, knew nothing. At New-Haven he fell, I am happy to say, into very different hands than those of the Hon. Mr. W. of Boston, or of Polonius at Newport. He was the guest of that honest and noble man, if God ever made one, the late Mr. Samuel Foote. On the next morning after the lecture, Mr. Foote took Mr. F. in a buggy, and drove through the beautiful town of New-Haven and its environs; showed him his houses and cottages which would be marvels of elegance in Virginia, and informed him, without any allusion to log-cabin, that many of these mansions belonged to mechanics, and some, even, to day-laborers. Fitzhugh was thunder-stricken. He had professed Free Society a failure without even leaving his State; nobody replied to him, but he went home answered. He always preserved an ominous silence about the visit; but he acknowledged his mistake about Northern Society, and thought before that he had invariably printed a pamphlet every six months in favor of the "Sociology of the South." I believe he has not penned a line of the kind since. The grave and impressive rebuke of Samuel Foote, who simply said that he "would take him (Fitzhugh) out to see how Free Society had failed," was never lost. Mr. Foote was a gentleman in an old sense, which is sometimes forgotten even in Scholastic Boston; that is, he was gentle but always man.

If Southern men would often refrain from plunging their members, and clandering their own country; did they act this manly and gentle part toward Southern men, I can imagine many benefits which must flow from such a course. The South without respect to the North, and the sentiment of the North without having to be engendered first. The South always believed that the North would come to the last as she had been doing for fifty years. What say you, gentlemen, are we done crying? Or is Mr. Vallandigham and his posture to be first endured, then pined, then embraced, or, according to the poet, is the way with moral monsters? "I do not trust him," said Richelieu of the soldier, "he stops too low." Hamlet never despises Polonius more than when the latter fools him to the top of his bent. Had the North been determined, outspoken, and faithful to herself, she must have been faithful also to the South, and might have averted the minor which now catenates our Southern brother's heart; having, instead, fostered that tumor until delirium has superseded it, must now rescue that brother, if he can be rescued, by the painful surgical way.

JUSTICE TO CAPT. BENHAM.

To the Editor of *The N. Y. Tribune*.

Sir: I find in a letter of your correspondent from Beverly, giving an account of the war in Western Virginia, an attempt to disparage the recent grand achievement of the other branch of the same army, which routed the rebel force at Carrick's Ford. The writer complains that more was not done by Gen. Morris's division; and compares the results disadvantageously with the achieved by the division of McClellan. The injustice is so great as to be glaring, and demands the following correction—as the following facts will abundantly show:

The division of Gen. McClellan consisted of nearly 10,000 men, and at the battle of Rich Mountain they defeated a force under Col. Pegram of some 2,000. Of these not more than 350 were in the intrenchments stormed by Gen. McClellan's brigade of 1,000 to 1,500 men, and when those were conquered Col. Pegram retreated from his intrenchments, and found himself compelled by hunger to surrender, two days after, his remaining force of 600, the rest having got away.

Gen. Garnett's force, however, comprised the main body of the rebel army, and numbered 8,000; and when their retreat was pursued by Gen. Morris's brigade of less than 5,000, only the advance guard of this brigade, under Capt. Benham, could, by any possibility, be hurried forward fast enough to overtake the retreating foe, in face of the storm, and the obstacles which impeded their pursuit. They behaved with a valour which cannot be too highly appreciated. After an exhausting march of nearly two days, this body, of about eighteen hundred in all, came up with the rebel army, posted in a most formidable position, on a bluff fifty to eighty feet high. The men had tasted no food since Friday evening, some of them not since Friday morning, and were now 20 miles from Saturday. Yet such was their spirit that in these circumstances they attacked the foe without a moment's hesitation or delay. Capt. Benham ordered the Indiana troops into the bed of the river, where they were protected by the steepness of the bank from the enemy's cannon, and thus enabled his men to pass down the river, and reach the enemy's position. This judicious and prompt measure saved many lives, and secured the victory. Attracted at once in flank and in front, though by so inferior a number, the enemy broke and fled, leaving their commander dead upon the ground, losing their cannon, their military stores, and their provisions, train, and some 200 dead and 50 prisoners.

Yours correspondent seems to imply that Gen. McClellan was disposed to censure this as a meager and inadequate result, for an attack by this small brigade upon a strongly posted enemy of four times their number. Permit me to assure you that I have decided reason to know that Gen. McClellan has, on the contrary, expressed his most decided approval of the action of the soldiers in the handling of this heroic brigade—an opinion in which Gen. Morris most warmly concurs. Capt. Benham has been performing the duties of a Brigadier-General for weeks past, and the direction of the whole division of Gen. Morris has been intrusted to his hands with the most successful results.

His military and personal merits are so well known to the Chief of the Adjutant-General's Department as a Major; subsequently he was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel, and very recently to Colonel (the highest rank in his department recognized by law), and now he is recommended for promotion to General. Will this officer admit that he is more competent than his division to direct the operations of the army, or even Captain? If not, why make these the favorite and aristocratic arms of the service? The truth is, no changes are ever made in the organization of the army unless these corps participate largely in the benefits.

The correspondent of *The Tribune* says, with truth that in Eastern Virginia, where the rebel force was so much more numerous than ordinarily distinguished, and where a corresponding command of troops is given to the recipient of the honor; whereas with us it is too often obtained through political or personal influence.

These recommendations of the Secretary (who is in no sense a military man) originate in the Adjutant-General's office, the chief of which is recommended for promotion to the rank of Brigadier-General. Now it is not proposed to give the officers of any of these staff corps the command of troops, where there is the necessity of an increased rank; neither is it pretended that in the existing war they have performed any distinguished services. The ostensible reason for an increase of rank and promotion in these corps is the necessity for an increase of numbers; but it is well known that this can be done as well by adding to the list of captains, for it cannot be assumed that the officers of that grade are in any particular inferior in talent or ability to those of a higher grade. For example, a short time since the Chief of the Adjutant-General's Department was a Major; subsequently he was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel, and very recently to Colonel (the highest rank in his department recognized by law), and now he is recommended for promotion to General. Will this officer admit that he is more competent than his division to direct the operations of the army, or even Captain? If not, why make these the favorite and aristocratic arms of the service? The truth is, no changes are ever made in the organization of the army unless these corps participate largely in the benefits.

The advantages they possess in a social, political and other points of view, are sufficiently evident and admitted by the public mind, and it is not necessary to dwell upon them. The fact is, that the officers of these corps are cut off from such associations and influences as would secure them equal rights. In plain terms, this recommendation of the Secretary of War is only part of a scheme to benefit an exclusive class of officers, and to drain the Treasury, by way of increased pay, from the Treasury, to justify it. The next thing to deplete the Treasury will be a list of Brevets, in which these gentlemen will figure for additional rank, and at an enormous expense to the Government.

It is a great pity that the Government should be so wasteful in its expenditure. But the fact is, that the officers of these corps are cut off from such associations and influences as would secure them equal rights. In plain terms, this recommendation of the Secretary of War is only part of a scheme to benefit an exclusive class of officers, and to drain the Treasury, by way of increased pay, from the Treasury, to justify it. The next thing to deplete the Treasury will be a list of Brevets, in which these gentlemen will figure for additional rank, and at an enormous expense to the Government.

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